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Xenophon Poroi 5: Securing a ‘More Just’ Athenian Hegemony 
Abstract: The present study examines section five of Poroi and Xenophon’s proposal to 
restore the reputation of Athens. After outlining his plan for ‘justly’ supplying the dēmos with 
sufficient sustenance in Poroi 1-4, section 5 addresses the desire to regain hegemony after 
Athens had lost the Social War. Xenophon does not adopt an anti-imperialist stance; instead 
he seeks to re-align imperial aspirations with Athenian ideals and earlier paradigms for 
securing hegemony. Xenophon’s ideas in Poroi are contextualized with consideration for his 
‘Socratic’ distinction between tyranny and kingship, as well as his wider advice for ruling 
well. It is shown that his proposals for securing the consent of the allies reiterates ideas that 
Xenophon outlines across his corpus, especially Hiero and Cyropaedia. In Poroi Xenophon 
therefore applies his political thought in an attempt to re-direct Athenian ambitions away from 
policies that prompted charges of being a ‘tyrant polis’ and towards ‘legitimate rule’.  
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In 2009 Dustin Gish and Wayne Ambler co-edited a volume of Polis devoted to 
Xenophon. In their concluding remarks the pair observed that the level of ‘disagreements in 
interpretation suggest that the full depths of Xenophon’s political thought have yet to be 
fathomed and that such an enterprise remains a vital one’.1 The present work draws on a 
wider study of Poroi and the Xenophontic corpus in order to offer one such contribution 
towards achieving this end. Xenophon most clearly attempts to apply his thought directly for 
practical, political application in Poroi and yet its contribution to ancient political theory 
remains largely overlooked. From the work’s outset Xenophon expresses a two-fold aim: to 
ensure that all Athenians have sufficient sustenance, and to restore the standing and reputation 
that Athens once enjoyed throughout Hellas.
2
 To facilitate the realization of both ends 
Xenophon presents a series of economic proposals for capital investments and internal 
improvement projects that dominate the first four sections of Poroi. To date the 
overwhelming majority of scholarship on Poroi has focused on these economic aspects and 
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 D. Gish, D. & W. Ambler ‘Political Thought of Xenophon’, Polis 26.2 (2009), pp. 181-4,  
 p. 183. 
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 Poroi 1.1; all references to Xenophon’s works are to E. C. Marchant, Xenophontis Opera 
Omnia, Vols. 1-5, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900-1920). All translations are my own.  
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their plausibility, as well as the precise meaning of Xenophon’s concern ‘that sufficient 
trophē be produced for all Athenian citizens at public expense’.3 Yet this proves not only to 
be an end in and of itself, but also to be the means of securing Xenophon’s second stated aim 
– to help Athens justly re-secure hegemony across Hellas and the Aegean more broadly. What 
follows therefore evaluates Xenophon’s plan to transform Athenian hegemony from a 
suspected ‘tyranny’ into a legitimate rule over willing allies. By contextualizing the ideas of 
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Poroi 5 alongside the rest of the Xenophontic corpus, though especially Hiero and 
Cyropaedia, it is demonstrated that Xenophon attempts to re-align the imperial aspirations of 
the Athenian dēmos with his – and allegedly its – own professed ideals. For the purposes of 
the present study these are understood to be the terms that the Athenian dēmos swore to 
uphold in the prospectus of the Second Athenian Confederacy.  
Section one situates Poroi and the present study in their wider contexts. Xenophon’s 
stance on fourth-century Athenian imperialism is re-examined with consideration for his 
wider treatment of the concepts of hēsychia (quiet, peace) and apragmosynē (love of a quiet 
life), as well as the life of the archōn (ruler) and the life of the idiōtēs (private person). 
Section two then explores how Xenophon invokes the dichotomy of ‘tyranny’ and ‘legitimate 
rule’ in Poroi in order to re-direct Athenian action away from the use of coercive force; in 
order to persuade his audience to do so Xenophon draws on earlier, idealized presentations of 
successful Athenian leadership secured through benefaction. Part three develops the 
significance of this new reading of Poroi with reference to the work’s parallels to Xenophon’s 
Hiero. The result suggests that in Poroi Xenophon can be understood to offer the Athenian 
dēmos a ‘princely mirror’ that promised to remind Athens how to retain the allies it still had 
after the Social War and to suggest how Athens might undertake a third period of imperial 
ascendancy and once more be recognized as ‘King of Hellas’, rather than face rejection as a 
‘tyrant polis’.4  
 
Context for Poroi and the Current Study 
 
We may safely situate Poroi amid the imminent concerns of 355/4 BC on the basis of 
textual references to the unrest surrounding Delphi and the so-called ‘Social’ War.5 Beginning 
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c. 357 BC,
6
 the conflict witnessed the defeat of Athens at the hands of its former allies: 
Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, as well as the island of Cos. The war compounded the losses 
of Amphipolis with its gold and silver resources, as well as the poleis of Pydna and Potidaea 
to the rising power of Macedon and Philip II.
7
 Taken together, this string of defeats had 
serious political and economic consequences for Athens. The participation of Byzantium and 
Rhodes underscore the significance of the opposition facing Athens. Historically Byzantium 
and the poleis on Rhodes had held pivotal roles in ensuring the security of Athens’ external 
grain supply; therefore their mutual hostility to Athens in the Social War effectively re-
created the successful strategy that Sparta had deployed against Athens during the final 
decade of the Peloponnesian War. At that time Athens was cut off from its northern and 
southern trade routes; the precise nature of this external supply continues to be debated, 
though if they remained essential for feeding the population of Attica, the threat that 
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Byzantium and the poleis of Rhodes in the early 350s is magnified.
8
 When Xenophon 
composed Poroi the Athenian dēmos faced vital policy decisions that would have a profound 
impact not only on the future of Athens, but also on the political landscape of Hellas as a 
whole.  
While one may quibble over the feasibility of all or part(s) of Xenophon’s plan 
outlined in the first four sections of Poroi, Xenophon claims that such proposals were 
intended to ensure that all Athenians should enjoy adequate maintenance acquired justly. He 
therefore expresses his aspiration to see Athens enact each measure ‘in succession’ (kata 
meros), so as to ensure the means of maintaining all Athenians with provisions at the public 
expense (pasin Athēnaios trophēn apo koinou genesthai).9 The form and method in which 
Xenophon presents such advice unmistakably realize the expectations placed on the good 
citizen and the aspiring leader in Xenophontic thought.
10
 The same was true of the means of 
attaining the hegemony that Athens continued to strive for, even after its defeat in the Social 
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War. As shall be shown, Xenophon understood such stability to be the first step in the process 
of securing hegemony.  
Gauthier astutely observed a useful parallel between the language that Xenophon 
deploys in Poroi and the account of the fifth-century imperial vision that pseudo-Aristotle 
later attributed to Aristides the Just.
11
 According to pseudo-Aristotle ‘food/sustenance’ was 
promised ‘for all’, just as Xenophon does in Poroi.12 Following Aristides and ‘having seized 
the empire (archē),’ pseudo-Aristotle opines that the dēmos then ‘managed their allies 
despotically (despotikōterōs)’, but secured ‘an abundant food supply for the many’ and also 
sustained thousands of offices ‘from the common fund’ (apo tōn koinōn).13 While the 
language of the Athēnaiōn Politeia does echo ideas in Poroi, the precedent is already set in 
Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. Xenophon’s fictional Cyrus there outlined that sustaining an empire 
began with providing payment and sustenance for all whilst paying scrupulous attention to the 
‘public revenues’ (prosodōi); the latter reflects the alternate title of Poroi, which is peri 
Prosodōn.14 
In his study of Athenian imperialism in Poroi Dillery attempted to equate Xenophon’s 
sole invocation of the term hēsychia in Poroi with the concept of apragmosynē.15 The term 
apragmosynē is linked with ideas of ‘isolationism’ in foreign policy as well as individual 
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withdrawal from political life.
 16
 While Isocrates invites readers to make such a connection 
between hēsychia and apragmosynē because he explicitly opposes hēsychia to 
polypragmosynē in On the Peace,17 Xenophon never uses the term apragmosynē in a positive 
way. Moreover, claiming that Xenophon espoused a view of quietism in Poroi fails to explain 
why the policies that Xenophon outlines ultimately are intended to make Athens a polis 
‘better in war’ (eupolemōteran).18 
Across his corpus Xenophon distinguishes between at least three forms of hēsychia. 
The most common is neutral and denotes a quietness or stillness, for example of horses or 
soldiers at rest.
19
 The second is used as a pejorative and denotes passivity where action is 
required or expected. It is this form that Dillery invokes in his reading of Poroi, though 
Xenophon actually rejects this sense in all cases.
20
 Xenophon’s Cyrus the Great counsels his 
younger son to strive against this sort of hēsychia after the youth learns that he will not 
become king.
21
 The sense in Poroi actually belongs to a third category of Xenophontic usage 
that is positive and denotes a state of peace in opposition to war that enables prosperity, 
specifically one that allows its possessor to build material wealth.
22
 Xenophon similarly 
features Callias speak of this type of hēsychia in his capacity as an Athenian ambassador 
addressing the embassy sent to Sparta. Callias there observes, in very neutral terms, that the 
ambassadors were drawn from the same group of men that Athens elected to be generals 
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when the polis desired war and peacemakers when they desired hēsychia.23 This positive 
sense of peace also re-appears in the speech that Xenophon’s Croesus offers on the state of 
happiness that he and the Lydian empire had enjoyed before losing the war and, with it, their 
empire, to Cyrus.24  
In Poroi Xenophon deploys the word hēsychia only once, and he does so in order to 
invoke this third sense of the term that denotes ‘tranquility/peace’ defined by its opposition to 
the polis being at war. Xenophon’s use of the term hēsychia here explicitly invokes the stated 
purpose of the Second Athenian Confederacy in which Athens and its allies swore to resist the 
hegemony of Sparta so as to ensure that all members were ‘free and autonomous and to bring 
peace (hēsychia)’.25 This previously overlooked parallel to the official language of the decree 
initiating the Second Athenian Confederacy ought to put any debate to rest; by invoking 
hēsychia in Poroi Xenophon does not call on Athenians to abandon its hegemonic ambitions, 
rather he demonstrates concern for realigning Athenian actions with the oath that they had 
sworn two decades earlier when creating the second Athenian Confederacy. Compare, for 
example, the hēsychian agein of the prospectus of the Second Athenian League to 
Xenophon’s use of hēsychian agousēs in Poroi 5.3. To Xenophon the implications of such 
impiety invited the wrath of the divine and therefore helped to explain the loss of the Social 
War;
26
 Xenophon offers additional advice on how the Athenian dēmos could secure divine 
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consent in Poroi 6.  
Xenophon’s stance on withdrawal from public life is most explicit in Memorabilia as 
part of the condemnation of the hedonistic Aristippus and his desire to withdraw from society 
completely. Xenophon features Socrates attacking Aristippus and his proposed withdrawal as 
being not merely impractical but completely antithetical to realizing the sort of ‘happiness’ 
and ‘pleasure’ that Aristippus desires.27 Xenophon and his Socrates routinely reject 
idleness/withdrawal, whereas all work, save for ‘playing dice and other base pursuits bringing 
loss’, are identified as good.28 Xenophon’s Socrates even mocks the popular perception that 
he was an apragmōn and proclaims that he enjoyed ‘no leisure’, because he was perpetually 
occupied with both ‘private’ (idios) and ‘public’ (dēmosia) business.29 The rebuke of 
Aristippus also clarifies the connection between the ‘prosperity’ or ‘happiness’ (eudaimonia) 
and the ‘kingly’ rule to which Athens had long aspired and Xenophon promises to help secure 
in Poroi. As the discussion progresses, Socrates asks Aristippus: ‘do you wish us to examine 
this [question], whether the ones ruling or the ones being ruled are more pleasantly bound?’30 
Xenophon here reveals that Socrates equated this ‘royal art’ (tēn basilikēn technēn) with 
eudaimonia. Each comes at a cost repugnant to Aristippus, who speaks of this so-called 
‘kingly’ art as little more than being ‘willing or accustomed to endure painful things’ (ta 
lypēra). Yet Xenophon’s Socrates notes that the key lies in the willing embrace of such 
suffering for, by enduring, man gains controls over physical appetite and base desires as well 
as acclimatizing himself to toil so as to enjoy the ends of his pursuit.
31
 By the discussion’s 
close, Xenophon’s Socrates concludes that rulers, that is, those who possess self-mastery and 
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 Memorabilia 1.2.56-7. 
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put the common interest before their own, ‘toil gladly in these things and boil over with 
gladness, being content with themselves, and being applauded and emulated by all of the 
others’.32  
This connection between toil and rule proves a foundational tenet of Xenophontic 
thought that recalls the advice of Thucydides’ Pericles. Both Xenophon’s Socrates and his 
Cyrus the Great claim that human beings train themselves to be self-controlled and toil in 
order that they may enjoy greater rewards, of which the greatest is to rule.
33
 For example, 
once Xenophon’s Persians complete their conquest of Asia, Cyrus reiterates this message and 
advises them that they must continue ‘to toil’ (ponein) and to maintain the virtues instilled in 
them as children, particularly their ‘moderation’ (sophrosyne) and ‘self-control’ (enkrateia) or 
else they will lose ‘all of the good things’ that they have won.34 This also was the vision of 
Thucydides’ Pericles, who commends preceding generations of Athenians for building their 
empire through toil and sacrifice and exhorts contemporary Athenians to devote themselves to 
maintaining their empire in the same manner in his final speech.
35
 Amusingly this is also the 
message of Aristophanes’ ‘Just’ education in Clouds, which attacked Socrates. Indeed ‘Just’ 
aspires to teach Pheidippides ‘justice and sophrosyne’, which he identifies as the virtues 
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33
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instilled in the Athenians who fought at Marathon and later built the fifth-century empire.
36
 
This preference for the life of a ‘ruler’ (archōn), which in ‘interpoleis relations’ means 
choosing ‘empire’/hegemony, is a theme evident across the Xenophontic corpus. For 
Xenophon rule is always preferred to the life of the private person. Xenophon instructs 
Seuthes in Anabasis that it is more painful to appear a ‘private person’ (idiōtēs) after having 
been a king than not to have been a king in the first place’.37 Nor does Xenophon restrict this 
to individuals. Just as he observes that an entire polis can attain kalokagathia in Memorabilia, 
Xenophon also reflects his understanding that an entire polis can behave, or perhaps live, 
‘privately’ in Cyropaedia. Xenophon’s Cyrus the Great proclaims from his deathbed that he 
had found Persia ‘occupying a private station (idiōteuousan) in Asia’ but ‘left it honored 
above others’ as a ruling power.38 Instead of debating whether Xenophon advocates the 
pursuit of hegemony part two therefore considers Xenophon’s second stated aim in Poroi, 
that is, how he planned to help end the suspicion with which Athens was held across Hellas in 
355/4 BC and then regain hegemony. The choice Xenophon places before Athenians is 
identical to the one that his Simonides places before Hiero - rule of the willing or a tyranny 
over unwilling subjects. 
 
 ‘Tyrannical’ or ‘Kingly’ Rule. 
 
If choosing to rule was Xenophon’s answer to the question of whether one should 
withdraw or lead, then Xenophon’s follow-up question is whether that rule should manifest 
itself as ‘tyrannical’ or ‘kingly’. Xenophon’s stance from the outset of Poroi invites reflection 
on the theme of tyranny, which was associated with wealth won in a ‘disgraceful’ or ‘unjust’ 
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manner. For example, in the opening chapters of book one of his History Thucydides links the 
increase of tyrannies throughout Hellas to an increased desire to acquire wealth and the 
corresponding rise of naval power.
39
 In Poroi Xenophon opposes ‘unjust’ avenues for 
obtaining material gain and power. He notes that previous attempts to solve the financial woes 
facing Athens by force had cast suspicion over Athenian intentions and sabotaged Athenian 
hegemonies. As Xenophon presents things in Poroi, the reputation of Athens in 355/4 
justified the fears voiced by external critics of Athens. Recall that Thucydides previously had 
claimed that such behavior prompted the Corinthians to condemn Athens before the 
Peloponnesian War as a ‘tyrant’ and a ‘tyrant polis’ (polin tyrannon).40 Nor were external 
rivals the only ones to apply the label of tyranny to Athenian imperialism. The Athenian 
ambassadors of Thucydides justify their actions to the Spartans before the war noting that 
although their ‘rule’ (archē) should not prompt envy,41 it ‘had become hated’ by many, a 
reality which necessitated the suppression of revolts.
42
 In Thucydides all three poleis fulfill 
the stock roles already evident in the Histories of Herodotus,
43
 though the rebellion of the 
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allies of Athens in the Social War reiterates what this earlier literary tradition implies - a 
rejection of Athenian hegemony. More explicitly, the hegemonic ambitions of Athens were 
equated with tyranny in Attic comedy,
44
 oratory,
45
 and the speeches that Thucydides has 
Pericles and Cleon deliver.
46
 
Raaflaub has proposed that such invocations of tyranny were deployed in Athenian 
discourse because it was ‘good to think with’ and because “tyranny’ encompassed everything 
[…] hostile to democracy.’47 Poroi 5 reflects this dichotomy as Xenophon balances his advice 
between two arguments historically used to distinguish ‘kingly’ from ‘tyrannical’ rule, a 
metaphor that had been applied to label Athenian imperial power since the fifth century.
48
 
These concern the distinction between ‘unjust’ or ‘just’ gain on the one hand and the 
distinction between ruling by means of consent, i.e. the rule of law, or rule by means of force. 
In Memorabilia Xenophon uses this distinction in order to demonstrate Socrates’ definitions 
of ‘kingship’ (basileia) and ‘tyranny’ (tyrannis). According to Xenophon’s Socrates both 
‘kingship’ and ‘tyranny’ were forms of ‘rule’ (archē); yet the difference between them 
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concerned the consent of the ruled and ruling in accordance with the ‘law’ (nomos) rather 
than at the whim of the ruler.
49
 The authority of Xenophon’s ‘kingly’ rule looks to the laws 
rather than coercive force.  
In inter-poleis relations ruling in accordance with established law requires obeying 
one’s oaths. In the case of the Second Athenian Confederacy this denoted following the terms 
outlined in the decree of Aristoteles. The old debate manifest in the works of Bradeen and de 
Ste. Croix and finished definitively by Low concerning how the allies viewed Athenian rule 
over the Hellenes in the fifth-century as either benevolent or tyrannical proves to be of little 
concern here.
50
 While the precise causes of the Social War remain uncertain, the literary 
record makes it clear that Athens struggled to abide by the oaths that the polis had sworn in 
the decree of Aristoteles in 378/7 BC and that the allies could, and did, use perceptions of 
Athenian aggression to justify leaving the confederacy.
51
 The decree of Aristoteles had 
promised all those who became allies of Athens a permanent, defensive alliance that ensured 
the ‘freedom and autonomy and peace’ of all members. The Athenian dēmos similarly swore 
to: surrender territory it held in the lands of its allies, to not collect tribute, or to establish 
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cleruchies, garrisons or appoint governors in allied lands.
52
 The Athenians likewise agreed 
that severe penalties should be exacted from any member who violated, let alone proposed to 
pursue any of the prohibitions outlined in the oath. These included the loss of citizen rights, 
property, and either execution or exile from, and eventually the denial of burial in, Athens or 
the territories of its allies.
53
 The first to join the League were Chios, Rhodes, and 
Byzantium.
54
 These three ultimately led the rebellion against Athens in the Social Wars and 
Athenian evidence suggests that they were justified in doing so. As Harding observes, it is 
clear that the Athenians were then installing garrisons in allied poleis in 357/6 in violation of 
the oaths of the Second Athenian Confederacy.
55
 Even in the presumably more favorable 
accounts of Demosthenes and Isocrates, which were directed towards Athenian audiences,
56
 it 
becomes clear that the allies rebelled in their own right because Athens had violated their 
oaths. Xenophon, and later Demosthenes, outlined such ‘perjury’ as grounds for condemning 
Artaxerxes II, Artaxerxes III, as well as Philip of Macedon in their respective invectives 
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against their contemporary rivals, even where perjury or breaking oaths could not be proven.
57
 
In overreaching itself Athens lost part of its hegemony for a second time, along with nearly 
half of the original members of the confederacy listed on the stele of Aristoteles. In Hellenica 
Xenophon illustrates the significance of this in a speech that he presents Autocles delivering 
to the Spartans that explains the rejection of Sparta’s fourth-century hegemony. By ruling the 
Greek poleis without regard to law but by means of ‘force’ (bia) the Spartans are said to 
prefer to rule ‘just as tyrants’ do.58 In Poroi Xenophon builds on this understanding to suggest 
that if Athens was to stop further losses from the Second Athenian Confederacy, re-gain its 
former allies, and even forge new ties, it must modify its approach and seek to regain the trust 
of the Hellenes. 
For Xenophon the simplest proof of the need to change was defeat. In losing the 
Social War, Athens is reminded of its imperial capacity and power, that is, of the limits of its 
dynamis. In Poroi Xenophon therefore calls Athens to ‘know itself’; it is a task tailor-made 
for a Socratic disciple adopting the mantle of an Attic orator. In Hellenica Xenophon records 
that once Thrasybulus brokered a new peace with Sparta the restored democratic faction 
convened an assembly to address the defeated ‘men of the city.’ Amongst other themes, 
Xenophon reports that Thrasybulus advises the defeated oligarchs that they ought to come to 
‘know themselves.’ Beyond its Delphic and Socratic overtones, Xenophon declares that the 
oligarchic regime had justified its authority on faulty premises. Xenophon’s Thrasybulus 
observes that the defeat of the oligarchs was the simplest proof of this.
59
 In Memorabilia 
Xenophon’s Socrates outlines that knowing oneself also meant knowing one’s dynamis 
(capacity).
60
 As such, Xenophon implies that the Thirty sought to surpass their dynamis and 
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therefore were guilty of hybris;
61
 the same can be said of Athenian overreaches within the 
Second Athenian Confederacy in the fourth century.  
Xenophon anticipates criticism of his stance. He observes that ‘No one, I dare say, 
contests this [i.e. that peace will increase Athenian revenues]; but there are some who wish 
Athens to recover her ascendancy and they may think that it is much more likely to be won by 
war than by peace’.62 In Memorabilia Xenophon depicts the young Glaucon, brother of Plato, 
as one such individual.
63
 Yet Xenophon never denies the potential financial benefits of war. 
Rather he, and ultimately his fictional Cyrus the Great, speak of financial gain through 
conquest as a ‘just’ and entirely expected behavior in the right circumstances; Xenophon’s 
caveat concerns the source of such gain. For Xenophon just gain must result from actions 
taken against enemies rather than friends.
64
 Thus at Poroi 5.5 Xenophon does not imply that 
Athens had not financially benefitted from, or could not again, benefit itself through war. 
Rather he argues that it was naive to simply presume that war would bring success or prove 
the most effective means of doing so. It is far likelier, Xenophon argues, that war with other 
Hellenes – and the allies in particular – would diminish additional, otherwise safer methods 
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for raising revenues. To persuade his audience Xenophon offers a paradigm for securing the 
willing obedience of the allies; it is a variant of a theme at the heart of the Xenophontic 
corpus and one most recently analyzed in other contexts by Gray,
65
 though here it is deployed 
in the arena of inter-poleis relations.   
 
Case Study 1: The Delian League and the Perversion(?) of Benefaction? 
 
Against this idealized recollection of a bountiful financial harvest reaped from a 
successful imperial past, Xenophon recalls four instances drawn from Athenian history. He 
asks his listeners first whether it was by ‘coercing’ (biazomenoi) or ‘acting as a benefactor’ 
(eurgetountes) that the Athenians had won for themselves the ‘leadership’ (hēgemonias) of 
the fleet and control of the treasury of the Delian League?
66
 Gauthier thought the view of 
Xenophon a fallacy and a misuse of the notion of benefaction.
67
 Strictly speaking this is true, 
but the judgment ignores that Xenophon consistently advocates this paradigm throughout the 
entirety of his corpus. Thus, regardless of how we evaluate the perspective as a whole, it 
reflects Xenophon’s philosophy of rule through benefaction. Xenophon’s Socrates offers this 
same advice in Memorabilia,
68
 while Athens receives it directly in Poroi and indirectly in 
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Hellenica.
69
 Xenophon also held that Agesilaus had adopted this approach. He explains that 
Agesilaus exchanged his favors, rather than giving them away, for otherwise ‘no one would 
have thought that he owed Agesilaus anything; but the one having suffered a gift, always 
gladly became a servant to his benefactor’.70 Xenophon’s Simonides suggests the same 
paradigm to Hiero,
71
 and his Cyrus the Great similarly stakes Persian claims to empire on the 
basis of their benefactions.
72
 Individually Xenophon’s Cyrus the Great likewise is said to 
have secured the title of ‘father’ from those he ruled by ‘acting as a benefactor’ 
(euergetountos) rather than by ‘taking away’ what they had.73 In turn Xenophon’s 
Ischomachus, who speaks of Athenians emulating the ‘King’ of Persia,74 advocates the same 
methods for ruling an individual household.
75
 More specifically, Ischomachus expresses how 
benefaction can secure the loyalty of slaves and servants who easily can be understood as 
subject peoples when the practice is applied to interpoleis relations.
76
 In its own right linking 
the rule of the household with ruling a polis or even an empire proves suggestive of 
Xenophon’s wider political thought, though the theme merits development in its own right 
elsewhere.
77
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Although equating the absence of harm with benefaction may seem perverse to 
modern audiences, Xenophon’s Socrates again implies as much in Memorabilia. In turn 
Xenophon suggests that Socrates understood an unwillingness to act unjustly to reflect 
justice.
78
  Like Gauthier in Poroi, Sancisi-Weerdenburg objected to the same system in 
Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, which she deemed an apparent perversion of traditional reciprocity. 
She argued that in Cyropaedia receiving favours from Cyrus ‘meant recognition of the 
overlordship of the Persian king’.79 As an expression of their gratitude Cyrus’ subjects 
willingly bestow every imaginable gift on the King, which he then redistributes and so 
perpetually allows him to maintain his status as a benefactor to all.
80
 On his deathbed 
Xenophon’s Cyrus advises Cambyses, his eldest son and heir, that the power of a ruler lay 
with his friends and their just treatment.
81
 By this point in the narrative Xenophon’s Cyrus has 
demonstrated this method to his audience by dispelling the skepticism that Croesus vocalized 
about such a policy. Croesus had objected that excessive benefactions would leave Cyrus 
penniless; yet Xenophon says Cyrus refuted this through his experiment of asking each friend 
for an immense sum of money for an unknown venture, which they provided quickly out of 
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gratitude to Cyrus and his gifts.
82
 Once again Xenophon suggests that it is Cyrus’ ability to 
moderate his desires, i.e. to live modestly and to toil, as well as his ‘Socratic’ recognition that 
true wealth exists in having friends/allies who are grateful for just treatment and benefactions 
that enables rule over the household, the polis, and an empire. Xenophon offers the same 
paradigm to Athens in Poroi. The genius of this sort of inversion of ‘reciprocity’ and its 
application to the relationships between poleis lies, as Mitchell has demonstrated, with the 
appropriation of paradigms previously evident in personal relationships for inter-poleis ones, 
or what we might now call ‘international relations’.83 For Xenophon the careful cultivation 
and manipulation of ‘friendships’/alliances offers the capacity of an individual or an entire 
polis to secure willing rule and mitigates against the perception of enslavement. 
However ‘naïve’ we may find this ‘Xenophontic’ vision to be, he merely reiterated the 
history of the Athenian empire as the Athenians themselves knew it. In book one of his 
History, for example, Thucydides records that the Athenian ambassadors believed that Athens 
had won its empire ‘not by means of force’ (ou biasamenoi), just as Xenophon outlines in 
Poroi, but because the Spartans were unwilling to continue the war against the Persians.
84
 
Elaboration soon follows, as Thucydides adds that the Athenians said that they had ‘received 
their hegemony’ because the allies had grown to hate the treatment endured under the Spartan 
command of Pausanias and looked at Athens favorably.
85
 The idealized claim that Xenophon 
makes in this first case study of Athenian history echoes another view of the imperial power 
that Thucydides presents. More specifically it was the act of conferring, rather than of 
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receiving charis, his Pericles claimed, that had enabled Athens to win for itself the stronger 
position (bebaioteros)
86
 and had sown the seeds of friendship and debts that ultimately must 
be repaid to Athens.
87
 Thucydides again presents Pericles offering the same advice to Athens 
in his final appearance to offset the charge that Athens behaves as a ‘tyrant polis’. Returning 
to the theme of Xenophon’s Poroi once more, however, we are instructed that friends, i.e. 
allies, are won not ‘by means of force’ (bia) but ‘by means kindness’ (euergesia).88 As 
Papazarkadas highlights in his discussion of the late fifth-century empire, the form that 
Athenian imperialism took was flexible, oscillating at times between cruel force and 
reciprocal benevolence with no clear trajectory.
89
 It is therefore significant that Xenophon’s 
reflection in Poroi appear to be in line with one end of this spectrum and Thucydides’ 
presentation of fifth-century Athenian imperialism at its most idealized, if not the very peak 
of Athenian power. It also reflects lessons learned following shifts in Athenian imperial 
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policy down to the capture of Athens in 405, an event seemingly seared into Xenophon’s 
consciousness and infamously recorded in Hellenica.
90
   
 
Case Studies 2-4: The Second Athenian Confederacy and Fourth-Century Alliances with 
Thebes and Sparta  
 
The second case study that Xenophon offers invokes the failure of the first Athenian 
hegemony, itself ensured by the disastrous dénouement of the Peloponnesian War. Yet even 
this proved a short-lived rebuke. Xenophon observes that although ‘deprived’ of its ‘empire’ 
(archē) because Athens ‘seemed to lead too savagely’, he reminds his listeners that ‘after we 
abstained (apeschometha) from doing wrong/committing injustices, we again became the 
leader of a fleet of willing islanders’.91 This distinguishes Poroi from Isocrates’ On the Peace. 
Whereas Isocrates rejects all manifestations of Athenian hegemony after Pericles,
92
 Xenophon 
complements the Athenian achievements of the early fourth-century and reiterates that the 
foundation of the fourth-century hegemony offered a positive paradigm for leadership. 
Xenophon here refers to the Second Athenian Confederacy. The omission of the confederacy 
in Hellenica has prompted long-standing criticism of Xenophon as a historian, yet its 
appearance in Poroi is never discussed.
93
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Continuing, Xenophon details his third case study, i.e. the fourth-century alliances 
struck between Thebes and Athens. He observes ‘did not the Thebans receiving benefactions 
give themselves to the leadership of the Athenians?’ Overall Xenophon’s example remains 
largely undefined. It may combine the alliances between Thebes and Athens before the start 
of the Corinthian War in 396/5 BC
94
 and again in 378/7 when Thebes joined the Second 
Athenian Confederacy, or may simply refer to 396/5 or 378/7 individually.
95
 The fourth and 
final example that Xenophon provides invokes the alliance between Athens and Sparta forged 
after 371,
96
 noting ‘and indeed the Lacedaemonians as well, not being forced by us but being 
treated well turned over the leadership to the Athenians to set it up in whatever way they 
wanted’.97  
With each case study Xenophon repeatedly contrasts the willing obedience offered to 
Athens and the resistance to, or outright rejection of, Athenian leadership from those Athens 
suppressed by force. The rejection of force in Poroi neither implies Xenophon’s opposition to 
hegemony nor requires ideological justification. He merely argues to Athenians that their own 
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history offered documented failures of force in contrast to idealized successes that were 
associated in collective memory with leadership secured through acts of benefaction. The 
theme is also central to his stated purpose in writing Cyropaedia, which he outlines in the 
preface to that work that Cyrus was worthy of emulation not least because he secured the 
willing obedience of subject peoples; as noted previously Xenophon used these criteria in 
order to differentiate between ‘kingship’ and ‘tyranny’ in Memorabilia. Xenophon’s 
paradigm in Poroi therefore calls on Athenians to assume their ‘kingly’ role as an imperial 
power and forsake the path of tyranny. In this way Xenophon’s observation combines the 
expedient and the just. He also suggests that Athenian history demonstrates through the first-
hand experiences of his audience and their ancestors that extracting power and financial 
revenues by force was simply unsustainable.  
 
Transforming ‘Tyranny’ to ‘Rule’ in Poroi and Hiero 
 
The rhetorical argument that Xenophon advances in Poroi echoes the attempt of 
Xenophon’s Simonides to persuade or to ‘convert’ Hiero so that he will reject ‘tyranny’ and 
embrace legitimate ‘rule’.98 Xenophon’s Hiero rejects tyranny in his own words, highlighting 
a tenuous position that rendered all supposed pleasures inconsequential in light of the constant 
concern for security.
99
 For, according to Xenophon, it is fear for safety above all else that 
prevents a tyrant from surrendering rule and so enslaves the one person presumed to be the 
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‘freest’. Xenophon’s emphasis again echoes Thucydides, who outlines security as the 
principal motivation that Athenian leaders offered when seeking to justify sustaining the fifth-
century empire.
100
 Thucydides also highlighted the role that calls for security played in 
justifying some of the most aggressive decisions of fifth-century Athenian foreign policy. 
Two of the most notable instances where leaders invoke security in order to justify excessive 
force are the speech of Cleon urging swift execution in the Mytilenian debate and the call of 
Alcibiades for the Sicilian expedition.
101
 Both prompt action by inducing fear and desire in 
their audience. With respect to Cleon, what may appear unjust is understood as necessary and 
explicitly equated with the lot of the tyrant.
102
 In Cyropaedia, however, Xenophon depicts 
Cyrus in a strikingly similar situation. Although Cyrus is also initially inclined to pursue 
similarly draconian measures he is taught that mercy can win a more devoted ally and greater 
benefits in the future. Fittingly Cyrus learns this at the hands of Tigranes, whose own 
perspective on the matter is attributed to the education that he had received at the hands of the 
unnamed ‘Armenian sophist’ who is often equated with Socrates.103 In Poroi Xenophon 
assumes the role of Tigranes and offers the same ‘Socratic’ advice to Athens. 
Xenophon poetically captures the consequences of ruling over others in Cyropaedia, 
Hiero and Poroi. Both Xenophon’s Hiero and fifth- and fourth-century Athenians have the 
rare experience of enjoying the pleasures and pains of both ‘private’ life and life as rulers over 
unwilling subjects, itself the prompt for Xenophon’s Simonides to engage Hiero in 
conversation in the dialogue.
104
 Both Hiero and mid-fourth-century Athenians lament their 
uncertain fates, possess inadequate resources and few allies; in turn both fear that they cannot 
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undo their unjust acts of hybris. The most dramatic instance arises by comparing Xenophon’s 
description of Hiero
105
 with his vivid depiction of the Athenians mourning their anticipated 
fate in the closing days of the Peloponnesian War.
106
 There he reports that the Athenians 
actively began to mourn and anticipate retribution for their imperial atrocities during the 
Peloponnesian War as Lysander and the Spartan fleet closed in on a polis with no meaningful 
defense. Faced with a similar crisis of self-discovery Xenophon’s Hiero proposes that, 
constantly beset by enemies and devoid of all the pleasures of life, the tyrant alone benefits 
from suicide.
107
 Yet Xenophon has Simonides offer the tyrant an escape that was as 
applicable to Athens in the wake of the Social War as it was to his fictional Hiero. Salvation, 
Xenophon argues, lies with legitimate ‘rule’. That is, safety relies on transforming a ‘tyranny’ 
into a beloved rule through securing the willing obedience and loyalty of the ruled, just as 
Xenophon claims Cyrus had done in Asia and still could be done in Europe in the preface to 
Cyropaedia.
108
   
The impetus in Hiero concerns the deep-seated pessimism of the tyrant. Simonides 
finally addresses the concerns of Hiero in the closing chapters of the dialogue and his 
proposals closely parallel the advice that Xenophon offers to Athenians in Poroi. Simonides 
attempts to reform, or perhaps re-direct, the nature and future of the power that Hiero wields 
and explains how Hiero ought to build new relationships with those he presently commands 
and may yet come to rule. Xenophon’s Simonides suggests that he can equip Hiero to lay 
down his tyranny and realise the true benefits of ‘rule’ (archē), which Xenophon holds to be 
more advantageous than the life of a ‘private individual’ (idiōtēs). Xenophon’s Simonides 
proposes solutions directed towards helping Hiero achieve this end; these are strikingly 
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similar to the call for beneficial and philanthropic treatment that Xenophon advocates 
throughout the first four sections of Poroi; there Xenophon suggest that the Athenians adopt 
philanthropic (philanthrōpa) steps that will secure the loyalty and service of non-Athenians 
and will make the polis a more attractive destination.
109
 Thus Xenophon signals that his 
advice is not limited to any one particular type of constitution. Rather, it represents a flexible 
strain of Xenophon’s political thought consistently applied throughout his corpus. Indeed he 
outlines the same principles in Memorabilia and Hipparchikos.
110
 Yet another implication of 
this conclusion is to acknowledge that Xenophon’s proposals in Poroi do not reflect a 
‘remarkable conversion’ in his thought as Cawkwell once objected, prompting Gauthier to 
soften his stance on Xenophon’s political outlook in Poroi.111 
In his seminal study of Hiero Strauss suggests that the dialogue is divided into two 
‘unequal’ parts. He proposes that chapters 1-7 permitted Xenophon’s Hiero to show the reader 
that the life of the tyrant is not worth living, while part two, consisting of chapters 8-11, 
enabled Xenophon’s Simonides to demonstrate that ‘the tyrant can be the happiest of men.’112 
Higgins subsequently elaborated on this reading, especially in his discussion of Hiero 10.1 
and observed that this shift is matched by the change in Xenophon’s vocabulary where 
references to ‘tyranny’ become less and less common.113 As the work’s final sections unfold 
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Simonides increasingly stresses ‘rule’ (archē). Also speaking of this transition from ‘tyranny’ 
to ‘rule’ Rasmussen objected that Xenophon’s conversion of Hiero is not, as Aristotle later 
suggested ‘reforming tyranny by assimilating it to kingship, in essence, mitigating the tyrant’s 
vicious nature by turning him into a king’. Rather, Rasmussen claimed, Xenophon’s emphasis 
rests upon securing ‘happiness and success as tyrant.’114 Yet this distinction proves erroneous 
in the full context of Xenophon’s thought. The steps that Xenophon takes to ensure the 
happiness and success of the tyrant also result in the increased success and happiness of the 
polis/subjects ruled. For Xenophon this increases the likelihood that the ruled will be led/obey 
willingly rather than through coercion and thus demonstrates a path for directing rule away 
from tyranny and towards kingship according to his Socratic definitions of tyranny and 
kingship in Memorabilia. As an imperial power trying to maintain and expand its influence, 
Athens faced the same challenges and desired the same ends as Xenophon’s Hiero; in 
particular both sought eudaimonia, which Rasmussen translates as ‘happiness’, but also 
denotes material prosperity.  
In Poroi Xenophon offers Athens the same hegemonic alternatives that his Simonides 
offers Hiero. That the Greek term archē can denote both the rule of an individual 
monarch/magistrate as well as the rule of one polis over others, i.e. what we understand to 
denote ‘empire’, makes the parallel between Xenophon’s Hiero and the choice he places 
before the Athenian dēmos in Poroi all the more compelling. Nowhere in Poroi does 
Xenophon outline his expectation that Athens will simply withdraw and watch as events 
unfold around them. Rather, Xenophon explicitly outlines how he envisions Athens will once 
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again assume an active role in shaping the next phase of Hellenic history most notably by 
resolving the Sacred War.
115
  
Xenophon hints at this new Athenian role in Hellenic affairs when he chides those 
who think Athenian ascendancy was ‘more likely to be won by war than by peace’.116 The 
implication of Poroi is that preeminence may be attained through both avenues but that 
initiating war merely seemed to be the more straightforward of the two. Xenophon makes this 
view clear as he continues: ‘and now, at any rate, it seems to me that on account of the 
political confusion that has befallen Greece, the polis can regain the Hellenes without toil, 
without danger, and without expense’.117 He here employs the verb anaktasthai, which 
fittingly denotes the recovery of rule as well as the winning of both friendship and favors.
118
 
Both senses of the word suit the proposals that Xenophon outlines in Poroi and Cyropaedia. 
Superficially this result appears to align closely with Isocrates’ On the Peace. Though, in 
contrast to Isocrates who argued that Athens should imitate Sparta so as to reclaim 
hegemony,
119
 Xenophon reiterates Athenian paradigms for doing so. More significantly, 
Xenophon offers practical advice in Poroi for how Athens might proceed whereas On the 
Peace lacks comparable constructive advice. 
According to Xenophon the first step that Athens should take on the path to attaining 
its third phase of imperial ascendancy is ‘to attempt to reconcile the poleis warring with each 
other’ and then to ensure through diplomacy that the shrine of Delphi remains autonomous, 
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i.e. an allusion to the Third Sacred War (356-46 BC).
120
 He argues that by ‘appearing to be 
cultivating peace in every land and sea, in truth I believe that all would pray for Athens to be 
safe after their own homeland’.121 Both Higgins and Delebecque have suggested that the 
closing lines of Xenophon’s Hellenica signal the same opportunity.122 In Poroi Xenophon 
emphasizes his belief that by shifting away from the failed paradigm of exploiting the allies 
and towards internal improvements and just treatment of friends and allies, the Athenians will 
realize the ‘security’ (asphaleia) and ‘prosperity’ (eudaimonia) that they craved justly, and 
therefore with divine support, itself the focus of the final chapter of Poroi.
123
  
 
Conclusions  
 
In Poroi 5 Xenophon offered Athens advice for transforming the remnant of the 
Second Athenian Confederacy and converting its perceived ‘tyrannical’ hegemony into a 
‘just’ rule that aligned with the oath of the Second Athenian Confederacy. His ideas reiterated 
a paradigm for winning hegemony through benefaction that was familiar to Athenian 
audiences from their own historical traditions and is consistent with Xenophon’s wider views 
on leadership and empire. Throughout the Xenophontic corpus Xenophon argues that 
rule/hegemony was preferable to the quietist-withdrawal embodied in the so-called ‘private’ 
life.  
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For the better part of two millennia readers presumed that Xenophon was a devotee of 
monarchy,
124
 not least because of his alleged influence on Alexander the Great. It is therefore 
ironic that it was the actions of Philip the Great, whom Xenophon never mentions, that 
offered the strongest endorsement for the effectiveness of Poroi’s strategy for securing 
hegemony in the second half of the fourth century. For it was Philip’s intervention in the 
‘Third’ Sacred War that helped to restore ‘autonomy’ to the shrine at Delphi, and it was Philip 
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who managed to capitalize on this ‘goodwill’ to then conquer the Hellenes by striving to bring 
the feuding poleis to peace. Philip achieved what Xenophon exhorted Athens to do in Poroi 
and what Demosthenes later chastised Athenians for failing to do in his Fourth Philippic.
125
 
In the fourth century the dēmos continued to conceive of its domestic and imperial rule in 
‘monarchic’ terms, a metaphor enhanced through visual representations in which the 
personified Dēmos appears crowned.126 Yet none has ever considered that Xenophon’s 
concern for what he happened to call the ‘kingly art’ (tēn basilikēn technēn), might be 
directed towards enhancing the rule of the Athenian dēmos. Nevertheless this is what 
Xenophon offers his audience in Poroi, the choice between Xenophon’s Socratic conception 
of ‘kingship’ or the allegedly unjust, and therefore ‘tyrannical’, approach that the dēmos had 
stood accused of adopting since the fifth century.  
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Perhaps one reason for the relative lack of interest that political theorists have 
expressed towards Xenophon throughout the twentieth century can be explained by the reality 
that Xenophon’s approach to the problem of governing appears to be less theoretical than 
Plato’s but, like the works of the Attic orators, was more concerned with addressing 
pragmatic issues facing the everyday workings of the Athenian government. In cases where 
Xenophon’s works have been understood as examples of political theory, e.g. Hiero, we 
therefore stand to gain greater appreciation of his purpose and a new awareness of their 
potentially broader beneficiaries by contextualizing their ideas within the entire Xenophontic 
corpus as well as the contemporary political concerns facing fourth-century poleis. Hiero may 
superficially address itself to a long-dead Sicilian tyrant, albeit one who provocatively shared 
a name with a member of the Thirty,
127
 but its advice transcends constitution type. Thus Poroi 
may be understood as a sort of ‘princely mirror’ for the Athenian dēmos in which Poroi 5 
offers an alternate path for regaining preeminence across Hellas justly, something that 
Isocrates either failed or, more aptly, decided not to do in On the Peace.
128
 In place of an 
Athenian ‘tyranny’ Xenophon proposes that the financial lifeblood and security of the 
Athenian dēmos could be realized in ever-greater amounts without exploiting the allies. The 
proposals outlined in Poroi 1-4 aspired to establish a financially stable and politically 
ascendant Athens that would be capable of leading willing allies and enable the dēmos to be 
acclaimed once more as the ‘king of Hellas’ just as it had in fifth century.  
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